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Abstract 
 
The recent worldwide trends in the business world, and the economy at large, 
are cause for concern. Corporate governance standards are in decline and economic 
inequality has risen to absurd levels. People are experiencing increasing feelings of 
alienation. Employee ownership is not an entirely new concept; it is, however, 
unknown to the majority of the population, even those in the business sector. 
Employee-owned businesses tend to be more productive, are more resilient to 
negative economic shocks, promote integration in the workplace and reduce 
inequality by sharing profits with employees. Even companies with residual levels 
of employee ownership seem to outperform their traditionally run peers. The 
following dissertation places employee ownership under scrutiny, assessing the 
potential advantages and drawbacks of this business model. After analyzing a 
diverse body of research on the subject, the conclusion is clear: even though it is not 
a right fit for every business, employee ownership has incredible potential. 
Implementing it requires a great deal of strategic coherence in order to maximize its 
benefits, but if successfully executed, the positive results are undeniable. 
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Resumo 
 
Os desenvolvimentos atuais no mundo empresarial e na economia, a nível 
global, devem ser encarados com uma certa preocupação. Os padrões de qualidade 
no governo das sociedades parecem estar a degradar-se. A desigualdade económica 
atingiu um ponto crítico, e prevê-se que ainda vá piorar. A inclusão dos empregados 
na estrutura empresarial não só de forma participativa, mas também na própria 
propriedade das sociedades para as quais trabalham apresenta-se como uma fonte de 
viragem conceptual relativamente às discussões tradicionais sobre a administração 
de empresas e os direitos dos trabalhadores. Empresas que implementam este 
modelo de gestão tendem a apresentar níveis mais elevados de produtividade, são 
mais resistentes contra recessões económicas, promovem uma integração 
significativa dos funcionários no seu local de trabalho e combatem a desigualdade 
económica através da partilha parcial dos lucros com os trabalhadores. Mesmo nos 
casos em que a participação na propriedade da empresa é reduzida e os níveis de 
codeterminação dos trabalhadores são baixos, alguns desses benefícios ainda se 
manifestam, se bem que de modo menos intenso. A presente dissertação constitui 
um esforço para averiguar até que ponto este novo modelo de gestão empresarial, 
desconhecido por muitos, tem potencial para melhorar o panorama económico atual, 
ou se não passa tudo de uma fantasia fracamente engendrada. Os resultados sugerem 
que a “employee ownership” (conceito que não foi, até hoje, adequadamente 
traduzido para o português) tem um enorme potencial, apesar de não ser um modelo 
adequado para todas as empresas. A maximização dos seus benefícios requer uma 
concretização estratégica complexa, mas os frutos de tal esforço revelam-se 
ponderosos. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The importance of human and organizational capital (along with their 
development through strategic human resource management) is being 
acknowledged more and more in recent years, supported by academic findings 
(Wright, Dunford, and Snell 2001; Wagner, Parker, and Christiansen 2003; Bowen 
and Ostroff 2004; Becker and Huselid 2006; Collins and Smith 2006; Combs, Liu, 
Hall, and Ketchen 2006). In spite of these developments, employment practices 
appear to be changing in ways that promote mobility on the part of employees, 
devaluing loyalty and commitment. Regulations regarding employment security 
were slackened during the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, promoting labor 
market flexibility. 
Employee ownership is a promising alternative model to the traditional 
business paradigm. It has been shown to increase productivity, improve work 
satisfaction and enhance the survivability of companies during economic recessions 
(Kurtulus and Kruse 2016). On top of that, it has the potential to reduce economic 
inequality by broadening access to capital income and, therefore, expanding the 
distribution of wealth. 
Research on employee ownership has found mostly positive results (O’Boyle, 
Patel, and Gonzalez-Mulé 2016), but there are, of course, sceptics and critics. If it is 
indeed linked to so many positive outcomes, how does one explain the low levels of 
adherence to employee ownership? Could it be too good to be true, based on 
fantasies and wishful thinking? Or is the business world missing out on the next big 
thing? 
Employee ownership is certainly not a panacea. Like everything in life, it 
flourishes under certain conditions, and is inadequate in others. It does, however, 
have a lot of unrealized potential, and deserves to be noticed and more broadly 
known. 
This dissertation consists of a literature review, performed in order to better 
understand the effects of employee ownership, how to explain their occurrence, and 
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to assess in what scenarios its implementation is most viable. This requires an 
analysis of how employee ownership operates in different forms and environments, 
so as to determine potential synergistic and antagonistic factors. The confrontation 
(and subsequent integration) between conflicting points of view on the subject, 
presented by different authors, is also indispensable for determining the strengths 
and weaknesses of employee ownership. 
 
1.1. Methodology 
The quality of a literature review is heavily dependent on the foundational 
sources on which it is built. In order to assure the quality of the cited academic 
articles, only articles published in journals with a rating of 3 or higher in the 
Academic Journal Guide (published by the Chartered Association of Business 
Schools) were consulted. Articles published after the year 2000 were given 
preference, but in account of the relevance of a few older pieces, this criterion was 
not strictly adhered to. 
The following keywords were utilized for the retrieval of relevant literature: 
employee ownership, broad-based employee ownership, employee stock ownership, 
employee share ownership, human resources, human resource management, high 
performance work practices. This process resulted in the analysis of 31 academic 
journal articles, 14 book chapters, 1 book, and 6 publications from assorted sources 
(such as the International Labour Organization and the Economic Policy Institute, 
among others). 
Employee ownership has many facets that must be taken into consideration 
in order to perform a thorough assessment of the subject. As such, this dissertation 
has a somewhat compartmentalized structure, allowing for a separate discussion 
regarding each of the relevant topics retrieved from the literature, but with the 
necessary degree of permeability so as to avoid a fragmented verdict. 
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2. What is employee ownership and why does it matter? 
 
2.1. What is employee ownership? 
Employee ownership is not a new concept in the business world (O’Boyle, 
Patel, and Gonzalez-Mulé 2016), particularly in the United States of America where 
the adoption of employee ownership plans by companies has become somewhat of 
a common practice (Kruse, Blasi, and Park 2010; Kurtulus and Kruse 2016) – in 
spite of this, it remains relatively unknown to the general public. Put in simple terms, 
it refers to the ownership of a company, in part or in whole, by some or all of its 
employees. This short description, however, masks the myriad of intricacies that 
must be taken into account when contemplating its potential real-world application. 
These complexities will soon be explored in greater detail. For now, a few 
introductory pointers shall suffice. 
Employee ownership can take many different forms depending on various 
factors. Therefore, some clarifications must be made in respect to this particular 
dissertation. 
The concept of employee ownership, as it will be discussed, refers only to 
cases in which the distribution of shares by employees, or the possibility of 
participating in stock ownership plans, are broad-based – in other words, available 
to all or most workers of a company (Kurtulus and Kruse 2016). 
Share plans which are available only to a narrow section of top executives 
and managers, despite their extremely common usage, will not be considered as 
employee ownership. These compensation schemes have existed for quite some 
time, created as an attempt to align the executives’ interests with the shareholders’ 
goals or, in other words, to mitigate the agency problem. Seeing as they are mostly 
irrelevant to the bulk of the workforce, especially the lower tiers, they fall out of the 
scope of this discussion. 
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Broad-based employee ownership in large, publicly traded firms is very often 
residual, with the combined company stock of all employees who own shares being 
small and insignificant (Kurtulus and Kruse 2016; Mathieu 2018). 
Employee ownership is said to be substantial when the combined stake 
owned by employees is large enough to have a meaningful impact on the control of 
the company. A firm’s employees may also have a majority stake in its ownership, 
and at the extreme end of the spectrum, there are companies which are fully 
employee-owned. 
Employee ownership can be exercised directly, indirectly or through a 
combination of both methods. Direct ownership means employees become 
individual owners of shares in their company. Indirect ownership takes place when 
company stock is held, collectively, in a trust on behalf of the employees. 
 
2.2. Why does it matter? 
2.2.1. Resilience against economic recessions 
In a study focused on privately held companies with an established ESOP1, 
based in the United States, Blasi, Kruse, and Weltmann (2013) concluded that, when 
compared with similar non-ESOP firms in the same industry (during the period 
between 1988 and 1999), the privately held ESOP companies were only half as 
likely as the non-ESOP firms to go bankrupt or close, and only three fifths as likely 
to disappear for any reason. Non-ESOP companies also had significantly higher 
employment variability and their average annual employment change was negative, 
while ESOP firms showed slight annual employment growth, and generally better 
performance. 
Kurtulus and Kruse (2016) performed a thorough longitudinal analysis of the 
relationship between employee ownership programs and employment stability in the 
United States, spanning the period from 1999 to 2011, having found that companies 
                                                          
1 Stands for Employee Stock Ownership Plan. They are one of the most common forms of employee 
ownership in the United States, typically arranged as trust-based retirement plans. 
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with employee ownership plans had more stable employment levels and a greater 
likelihood of surviving when faced with economy-wide and firm-specific shocks, 
specifically during the 2001 and 2008 recessions. Different measures of employee 
ownership were analyzed: employer stock per employee, percentage of the firm 
owned by employees, and percentage of total employees participating in the 
ownership plans. All of these metrics were linked to positive outcomes, but the most 
influential one was found to be the latter: the more broad-based the employee 
ownership structure was, the better the firms performed. This fact could mean that 
the improved productivity, employment stability and firm survivability are more 
related to a cooperative workplace culture than to direct financial incentives. 
Positive effects have been observed after the implementation of employee 
participation plans with as little as a 1 percent stake in the corporation allocated to 
workers. As part of the aforementioned study, Kurtulus and Kruse (2016) compared 
firms with less than 5 percent of the company owned by employees to firms having 
over 5 percent worker ownership, with the results showing that the latter group 
performed substantially better regarding firm survival and employment stability. 
 
2.2.2. Increased performance 
The evidence points to a link between employee ownership and a multitude 
of performance benefits, such as heightened productivity, increased loyalty, more 
worker co-monitoring behaviors, additional willingness to work hard, and lower 
turnover (Blasi, Freeman, Mackin, and Kruse 2010). It has also been linked to higher 
levels of investment in formal and informal employee training (Kruse, Freeman, and 
Blasi 2010). 
In most observed cases of shared capitalism2, models of variable 
remuneration were implemented on top of regular pay and benefits, not as a 
substitution. As companies with employee ownership schemes have consistently 
been observed to survive longer and through worse economic environments than 
                                                          
2 The “shared capitalist model of work and compensation” or “shared capitalism” is a term coined by Richard 
Freeman to describe employment relations where the pay or wealth of workers is directly tied to their 
workplace or firm performance, such as employee ownership and profit sharing. 
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traditional firms, Buchele, Kruse, Rodgers, and Scharf (2010) propose that the 
former group must be experiencing significant productivity gains in order to support 
the increase in retribution. This appears to be a manifestation of the effect proposed 
by efficiency wage theory: the extra compensation offered by a company can pay 
for itself through the consequent gains in productivity. Or, utilizing the model put 
forth by Akerlof (1982) in his exploration of labor contracts as partial gift 
exchanges: employees respond to the gift of higher wages, ownership, and better 
working conditions with a reciprocal gift of higher effort and cooperation, to the 
benefit of the firm and also of their fellow workers. 
In the next section we will explore the mechanisms which explain the effects 
employee ownership can have in workers’ performance and attitudes, and how to 
optimally potentiate their development. 
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3. Employee ownership and the workplace environment 
 
One of the major recurring themes in the employee ownership literature is the 
notion that the contingent features of broad-based ownership have a greater effect 
on worker attitudes than the stock ownership itself (Pendleton 2010). The general 
consensus is that productivity gains are not likely to arise simply through the 
implementation of employee ownership of shares in isolation. The promotion of 
employee engagement is essential, namely through supportive workplace practices 
such as employee involvement in decision-making and firm-sponsored employee 
training. In fact, the implementation of employee ownership without high 
performance work policies, low supervision and fixed wages at or above market 
level has actually been shown to reduce job satisfaction (Blasi, Freeman, Mackin, 
and Kruse 2010; Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 2010; Weltmann, Blasi, and Kruse 
2015). 
 
3.1. The psychology of ownership 
Klein (1987) proposed and tested the validity of three distinct models 
regarding ESOP effects: 
 The “intrinsic satisfaction model” is based on the idea that ownership itself 
is the critical factor driving employee morale in companies with employee 
stock ownership programs (the size of the ownership stake would be 
proportional to the commitment felt by the employees); 
 The “extrinsic satisfaction model” suggests that the financial benefits of 
ownership are the biggest catalysts of employee satisfaction; 
 Finally, the “instrumental satisfaction model” proposes that an increase in 
worker participation and influence in decision-making is the most relevant 
variable regarding employee satisfaction. 
 
The results led to the conclusion that extrinsic rewards are correlated with 
higher employee satisfaction (“money matters”) and that management style has a 
powerful impact on employee attitudes. Specifically, the presence of an employee 
ownership philosophy (defined as management’s philosophical commitment to 
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employee ownership) and transparent communications about the stock plan were 
significantly positively related to employee outcomes and ESOP satisfaction. 
While the extrinsic and instrumental satisfaction models were found to be 
valid, the intrinsic motivation, of ownership by itself, had little impact on workers. 
Klein’s conclusion is that employee ownership is not intrinsically rewarding, but 
that when it is coupled with financial rewards, participative management practices, 
or both, it can lead to exponential increases in employee satisfaction and 
commitment. 
Another conception that emerged in the employee ownership literature was 
the idea of “psychological ownership” and the effects it has on employees’ 
perceptions. Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks (2001) proposed three interrelated sources 
in order to explain how organizational members come to feel psychological 
ownership. They are: 
 Control of the target. The more an employee can control a particular factor, 
the greater the feeling of ownership he will have toward that same factor. A 
good example is job design – jobs that provide greater autonomy inherently 
provide a greater level of control, which in turn increases the associated 
feeling of ownership; 
 Intimate knowledge of the target. The more information and the better the 
knowledge an individual has about an object, the stronger the feeling of 
ownership toward it. Information should, however, be coupled with other 
factors in order to magnify the perception of ownership – intensity and 
longevity of association also have a lot of influence; 
 Investment of the self into the target. This self-investment is not limited to 
time. It can be an investment of ideas, skills, or energy (both physical, 
psychological, or intellectual). 
 
Low levels of supervision, transparency about organizational goals and the 
ownership structure, easy accessibility of information, regular communications 
between management and the general workforce, promotion of employee 
involvement on various issues, worker training and skill development, job security 
and employee retention – all of these factors are related in some way to one of the 
three aforementioned originators of psychological ownership. In a nutshell, this 
means that the feeling of psychological ownership can be fostered through the 
Employee Ownership: a novel approach to business 
9 
 
implementation of a high performance corporate culture (Poutsma, Ligthart, and 
Kaarsemaker 2017). Additionally, in their conception of an “ownership high 
performance work system”, Kaarsemaker and Poutsma (2006) recommend that 
employees be trained for business literacy: the better they understand the 
information that is being shared about company business, the more they will feel 
integrated and empowered. 
Feelings of psychological ownership have been linked not only to enhanced 
performance but also to increased organization-based self-esteem and organizational 
citizenship (Pierce and Rodgers 2004; Van Dyne and Pierce 2004). 
 
3.2. Employee engagement and financial participation 
Levine (1990) framed employee participation as a reward in and of itself for 
employees, but one with gradually decaying levels of satisfaction associated with it. 
In order for participatory systems to be successful over a long time horizon, 
employees must be rewarded for their extra effort by receiving a share of the 
increased profits. If workers are not adequately compensated on account of the 
benefits generated by their cost-saving ideas and additional efforts, they will react 
negatively. As the author puts it, “group-based gain sharing provides workers with 
incentives to maintain norms of high effort, to monitor each other, and to sanction 
workers who shirk. More positively, group-based pay also gives workers incentives 
to cooperate and not try to advance at the expense of their colleagues.”3 
Levine proposed that in order to garner lasting employee support for 
participation, maximizing its benefits, four characteristics must be present in firms: 
 Some sort of profit or gain sharing; 
 Job security and long-term employment relations; 
 Measures to build group cohesiveness; 
 Guaranteed individual rights. 
 
                                                          
3 Levine (1990, p. 87) 
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Long-term employment is symbiotic with participatory systems for various 
reasons. Workers who are secure about the stability of their employment are more 
open to the idea of forgoing short-term gains in order to build up the company, 
because they expect to witness and participate in the firm’s continued success. 
Group-based rewards are also more effective if employees expect to be part of the 
work group for a long period of time. 
Many companies committed to assuring job security to their employees tend 
to prevent layoffs by establishing internal training programs and redeploying 
workers within the firm. In order for this investment in human resources to be 
justified, long-term employment relations are fundamental. 
Kruse, Blasi, and Park (2010) also consider job security to be an essential 
factor. In their words, “it is hard to maintain worker commitment and cooperative 
teamwork if employees are afraid they will be laid off.”4 The authors found that a 
very high percentage of participants in shared capitalism schemes evaluated the 
possibility of being laid off as unlikely. Indeed, job security was reported to be 
significantly higher in such companies. In addition, workers participating in profit 
sharing or employee ownership plans reported “a higher expected likelihood of 
working at the company for a long time, and of seeing their current jobs as part of a 
long-term career.”4 
Employee-owned firms, or companies planning to implement employee 
ownership in the future, should adapt their recruitment standards to reflect this 
commitment. In order to effectively manage an employee-owned business, 
managers ought to be transformational leaders, able to inspire people to work 
together (Avey, Avolio, Crossley, and Luthans 2009). Non-managerial employees 
should also be screened for compatible personal characteristics on top of regular 
work-related competencies, while making sure they understand the kind of 
workplace they will be joining. 
                                                          
4 Kruse, Blasi, and Park (2010, p. 60) 
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Compression of wage and status differentials, particularly between 
managerial and non-managerial employees, supports group cohesiveness. Narrow 
wage differentials can promote cooperation, while large wage gaps and competition 
for promotions will reduce it. Large differences in perceived status between workers 
and management have also been shown to inhibit participation. 
In order to narrow the wage differential, a company must not only raise low-
end wages, but also reduce the highest salaries. This compression of the wage gap 
may lead to difficulties in retaining high-achieving “star” employees, who in some 
industries (tech, for example) play a particularly pivotal role in a company’s success. 
A blend of individual and group-based incentives may alleviate this problem. In fact, 
shared capitalism is prevalent in the North American high tech industry (Kruse, 
Blasi, and Park 2010) – this higher than average recourse to employee ownership 
could be explained as an attempt to retain valuable workers. 
Hansmann (1996) also proposed that employee-owned firms function more 
efficiently when utilizing a less differentiated wage structure, since it reduces dissent 
among workers. Akerlof (1982) discussed the issue of workers’ perception of fair 
treatment, noting how it is influenced mostly by comparing oneself with others 
rather than by some absolute standard. 
Guaranteed individual rights increase the workers’ trust in the company. In 
order for employees to become committed to participation, they must be able to 
express their negative opinions and ideas for improvement without fear of reprisal 
by management. 
It is now clear that for employee ownership to function optimally, several 
adjustments must be made in the workplace environment, and that this process 
requires an appreciable level of commitment and investment. 
Having presented the various benefits of employee ownership, and identified 
how to synergistically develop an ownership culture though the strategic 
implementation of certain human resource management practices, it is now 
necessary to explore the counterarguments that some authors and researchers have 
advanced against it. 
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4. Objections to the employee ownership model 
 
There are three primary arguments against the viability of employee 
ownership (Hansmann 1996; Kurtulus and Kruse 2016). They will be presented and 
addressed in the following sections. 
 
4.1. The free-rider problem 
One of the most common objections regarding the shared capitalism model 
of group incentives is anchored on the free-rider problem. Based on the principles 
of game theory, the claim is that employee ownership (and the resulting profit 
sharing) cannot succeed because each individual has an incentive to neglect his 
professional duties, allowing him to reap the rewards of his colleagues’ hard work 
with little personal exertion (of course, if everyone thinks like this and assumes 
others do too, no one will put in the effort). In short, every worker would benefit if 
the whole team did a good job, but everyone has an incentive to shirk. 
A strong counter-effect to the free-rider problem can be achieved through 
worker co-monitoring, the process through which coworkers keep tabs on each other 
and intervene when someone is not pulling their weight. Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse 
(2013) found unsurprising patterns regarding this topic: 
 worker co-monitoring was higher in smaller firms in comparison to larger 
ones; 
 the existence of employee stock ownership improves worker co-monitoring 
rates; 
 the higher the intensity of profit sharing, the higher the likelihood of co-
monitoring behaviors occurring. 
 
The authors’ conclusion is that co-monitoring is best achieved through the 
combination of employee ownership with personnel practices that create a positive 
ownership culture.5 Another finding was that while large individual bonuses do 
                                                          
5 The erosion of the cooperative spirit natural to employee ownership is also a cause for concern, but there 
are certain steps firms can take in order to prevent it. Sauser (2009, p. 153) identifies two important threats 
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increase individual productivity, they also have a negative effect regarding co-
monitoring. It is possible that a combination of individual and group incentives 
could lead to more efficient results. 
Workers who consider their employment status to be stable and plan to 
remain with their employer for a long time will be less inclined to shirk. When 
employees face a repeated game, free-riding behaviors are not as appealing. A solid 
commitment on the part of the company to the retention of its workers (avoiding 
layoffs, promoting training and internal redeployment, and so forth) may foster a 
strong relationship with the workforce, boosting employee loyalty. 
According to Guthrie (2001), the implementation of high involvement work 
practices promotes employee retention. A lower turnover rate, coupled with the 
presence of high performance work practices, increases productivity. Conversely, in 
the absence of high performance policies, the retention of employees cannot be 
capitalized upon (since their human capital is not being properly developed) and 
does not lead to an increase in productivity. 
 
4.2. Financial risk 
One of the other major concerns regarding employee ownership is its 
financial risk. If considered purely from the perspective of a financial investment, 
workers owning shares in their own company leads to higher risk, because if the 
firm goes bankrupt the employees will have lost both their jobs and their investment. 
The common assumption is that workers should instead own stock in companies 
other than their own, in order to minimize risk through the diversification of their 
investments. 
Blasi, Kruse, and Markowitz (2010) share these worries regarding the 
potential for poor diversification in employee-owners’ portfolios. They suggest that 
                                                          
to employee-owned companies in particular: the first is “the apparent degenerative life-cycle of employee-
owned organizations” while the second relates to “the frailties of human nature, particularly as those frailties 
relate to the abuse of power.” The author suggests that in order to avoid a possible accumulation of power, 
employee-owned companies should utilize a corporate governance structure which divides power among two 
or more bodies. 
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“the optimal portion of an otherwise diversified portfolio that could potentially be 
in company stock is 8.33 percent, while 10 to 15 percent would have a small effect 
on the volatility of the employee portfolio.”6 Employee ownership is, therefore, 
compatible with diversification – these considerations do, however, add weight to 
the argument that financial education should be provided to workers participating in 
shared capitalism schemes, since these concepts are probably not broadly known, 
especially outside of the financial sector. 
There are other factors which may counteract the risks associated with low 
diversification. As previously discussed, employee ownership in the right 
circumstances can catalyze the productivity and the longevity of firms, which 
become particularly durable during recessions. These companies also tend to 
prioritize worker retention and job security. 
In fact, one could argue that the biggest form of financial risk for most 
workers is not the loss of value regarding their financial assets, but job loss itself. 
As a result of the aforementioned increase in job security and firm survivability, 
employees of companies with some form of shared capitalism plan could actually 
be subject to less financial risk than traditional workers. On top of this, it has been 
observed that in the majority of ESOPs, workers do not pay for stock with their own 
savings or wages. There is strong evidence that most employee-owners receive fixed 
pay and benefits that are at or above market level. This means that the supposed 
financial risk associated with employee ownership (particularly in the case of 
ESOPs) is in fact much lower than expected, because ownership tends to add to 
regular pay instead of substituting a portion of it (Kurtulus and Kruse 2016). 
Of course, there are situations in which employee ownership is used as a 
substitute for regular fixed pay. This arrangement tends to be appealing for 
executives and well-paid employees in general, but for financially challenged or 
otherwise low-wage workers, ownership as a substitute for fixed pay may not be a 
good fit – in respect to these employees, the positive effects of shared capitalism on 
                                                          
6 Blasi, Kruse, and Markowitz (2010, p. 121) 
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attitudes and behaviors are much more likely to occur when employee ownership 
comes on top of market-level wages and benefits. 
It has also been found that while risk averse employees are less inclined to 
buy their own company’s stock on the open market, those same risk averse workers 
tend to show interest in participating in employee ownership through other means 
(Kruse, Blasi, and Park 2010). 
Blasi, Kruse, and Markowitz (2010) offer further insights regarding this 
topic. They found that workers with high levels of economic insecurity responded 
poorly to shared capitalism arrangements, preferring fixed pay over variable pay. 
This negative response was less pronounced regarding ESOPs because, as discussed 
previously, these schemes tend to come on top of fixed pay and do not usually 
involve economic concessions by the workers.7 
However, the negative effects of workers’ economic insecurity regarding 
their perceptions and responses to shared capitalism were found to be significantly 
mitigated in good corporate culture environments, specifically regarding worker 
empowerment and positive employment relations. This means that “a substantial 
portion of the negative attitudes toward shared capitalism and the poor behavioral 
outcomes among the economically insecure is not due to economic insecurity per 
se, but to corporate cultures that provide little empowerment and poor employee 
relations.”8 The negative effects of economic insecurity can, therefore, be 
counteracted by policies that improve these factors. 
In general, the presence of high performance work practices reduced the 
negative response of economically insecure employees. The authors suggest that 
“workers have more willingness to have a profit or stock share in their company if 
they perceive that the company invests more in their performance abilities through 
                                                          
7 Typically, when an ownership stake is for sale to employees instead of being attributed as an additional 
incentive, and buying it is not mandatory, only highly-paid employees, who may already have some 
investment experience, will tend to participate. Companies will be more successful at involving a broad range 
of workers in ownership plans if shares are given as a part of (or as an addition to) regular compensation. 
Generally, relying on employees to buy shares by themselves will lead to low adhesion, excepting cases in 
which workers are highly motivated, such as during organized employee buyouts or when starting a brand 
new company. 
8 Blasi, Kruse, and Markowitz (2010, p. 118) 
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a high performance work system”9 and that even highly economically vulnerable 
workers are more open to variable performance-based pay when the work system is 
more progressive. 
Economic insecurity has the potential to completely undermine the benefits 
associated with employee ownership, particularly if combined with a poor corporate 
culture in the workplace. Employee ownership plans must, therefore, be designed 
more carefully when they involve workers in poor financial health.10 The above 
results do suggest, however, that employee ownership schemes need not be limited 
on account of the workers’ economic situation, but merely adapted to it. 
 
4.3. Employee involvement in corporate governance 
Hansmann (1996) points to another potential problem associated with 
employee ownership, specifically regarding worker involvement in corporate 
governance – the fact that many employees do not possess management skills and 
experience. The author uses the example of blue-collar workers who may not have 
the necessary knowledge regarding management or finance in order to effectively 
select or police the firm’s managers, or who may be short-sighted in their objectives 
for the company. However, the author does concede that “an individual employee 
need not herself have the expertise to make managerial decisions in order to exercise 
her voice effectively as an owner. She need only be able to vote intelligently in 
electing the firm’s directors.”11 
Ginglinger, Megginson, and Waxin (2011) analyzed the relationship between 
employee ownership, employee representation on the board, and corporate financial 
policies in French publicly listed companies. They found that directors elected by 
                                                          
9 Blasi, Kruse, and Markowitz (2010, p. 120) 
10 Experience suggests that if the full range of rights associated with property are readily available to 
financially challenged employees regarding their shares, these will rapidly be sold. This is precisely the 
opposite result employee ownership strives for. The goal is long-term shareholding, in order to intensify the 
workers’ feelings of connection with their company and to add a capital-based source of income to their 
wages (labor income). In order to foster this kind of long-term relationship between the firm and its 
employees, the plan should include some form of lock-in for a certain period of time. 
11 Hansmann (1996, p. 115) 
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employee shareholders promoted an increase in firm valuation and profitability and 
did not significantly alter corporate payout policy. In contrast, directors elected by 
“regular” employees (non-owners) reduced payout ratios, but had no impact on 
company value or profitability. The authors conclude that “on balance, employee 
representation on corporate boards seems to be at least value-neutral, and may 
actually increase firm valuation and profitability when employee shareholders elect 
company directors.”12 
In fact, it could be argued that a company’s workers are in some ways more 
qualified than outside investors to elect and police managers, based on the fact that 
they have access to a lot more internal information (especially regarding information 
circulating through informal channels) and are in contact with the firm on a day-to-
day basis. Some institutional investors do not care to probe beyond the numbers 
provided in quarterly reports, which do not paint the whole picture. 
Of course, as the number of employees grows, worker involvement in 
governance becomes more and more difficult.13 Even in companies with a low 
number of workers, their direct involvement in governance may not be efficient or 
even desired by them. Representativeness has to come into play at some point. By 
fostering employee education programs and maintaining transparent channels of 
communication between management and the general workforce, firms can make 
sure that their employees’ votes and inputs become more informed and, therefore, 
more valuable. 
                                                          
12 Ginglinger, Megginson, and Waxin (2011, p. 869) 
13 The maximization of the benefits of employee ownership seems to be harder to achieve in large companies. 
Kruse, Blasi, and Park (2010) propose that profit sharing may be the most efficient method for promoting 
cooperative teamwork on a day-to-day basis, while ownership may be better at affecting other outcomes, such 
as identification with the company, loyalty, and turnover intentions. If this is indeed the case, a combination 
of short-term (e.g. profit sharing) with long-term (e.g. share ownership) forms of incentive should provide 
the best overall results. 
Another problem can potentially arise from heterogeneity among workers. This caveat of employee 
ownership is often referenced in the relevant literature. Initially proposed by Hansmann (1996), the theory is 
that when the workforce is heterogeneous and has direct control of the firm, the differing employee interests 
and priorities result in substantial governance inefficiencies and costs. In contrast, when the employees 
involved in ownership are highly homogenous, employee ownership leads to significant benefits. The author 
suggests that the most suitable forms of employee involvement in governance in large corporations probably 
involve a combination of representative and fiduciary mechanisms. Employee shareholding trusts, when 
combined with transparent democratization practices, seem to be one of the most promising systems through 
which the heterogeneity inefficiencies could be minimized. 
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5. Employee ownership and the future of work 
 
Employee ownership, if properly implemented and supported, provides the 
opportunity to include employees in the economic growth of the companies they 
work for. It also promotes a different way of thinking about business, which may 
prove to be of particular relevance in the near future, considering the current global 
scenario. 
 
5.1. Wealth inequality 
If one assumption can be made with a great deal of certainty about the current 
state of the global economy, it is that wealth inequality is on the rise. Most research 
regarding this issue14 has focused on the United States of America, where the effects 
of inequality are felt with more intensity (Saez and Zucman 2016), but it is 
undoubtedly a far-reaching phenomenon. 
Standard economic theory espouses the view that compensation’s dynamics 
should reflect productivity’s developments, and that therefore the two should grow 
together. However, in nearly all advanced economies, the distribution of income has 
changed substantially, with the share of labor income in decline since the 1970s. The 
analysis of long-term trends in compensation and productivity leads to a clear 
conclusion: even though both have grown over time, compensation has done so at a 
much slower rate, leading to a considerable difference between the two. These 
assertions are entirely supported by the International Labour Organization’s recent 
Global Wage Reports.15 
                                                          
14 An important side note regarding the literature on this topic: the standard measure utilized in many studies 
is average income. However, if such analyses were performed utilizing median income instead of the mean, 
the capital-to-wages gap would manifest itself as significantly more pronounced. When using average 
compensation instead of the median as a measure, the results are significantly distorted in regard to the middle 
and lower income classes. The average is kept up by a large redistribution of pay to the top tier of earners, 
such as financial sector professionals and corporate executives, which means that the situation is very likely 
to be even worse than the studies show for low and middle class families. 
15 International Labour Office’s Global Wage Report 2016/2017: Wage inequality in the workplace (2016, p. 
15-20) and Global Wage Report 2018/2019: What lies behind gender pay gaps (2018, p. 13) 
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Executive compensation in publicly traded companies typically takes three 
different forms, often used in conjunction: a cash salary, a bonus related to the firm’s 
short-term profits, and stock options or some other method of compensation related 
to the company’s share value. The wage component of executive compensation, 
despite having grown significantly in recent decades, has been losing relative 
weight, as stock option awards account for a rising percentage of executives’ total 
pay package value.16 
Seeing as the share of capital income has been steadily increasing over the 
last few decades, involving employees in the financial markets may be particularly 
important. Company-sponsored share plans, especially if implemented as a 
complement to retribution or at least in financially advantageous terms, broaden 
access to capital income beyond the constraints imposed by the employees’ personal 
ability (financial or otherwise) to invest. 
 
5.2. Stockholder theory and corporate sustainability 
Milton Friedman famously argued in the 1970s17 that the sole social 
responsibility of a firm was to maximize profits, and that corporate managers should 
conduct business in accordance with the shareholders’ desires. The gist of the 
argument was that managers should strive to make as much money as possible for 
the owners of the corporations they work for. 
This marked the beginning of the currently widespread adoption of the theory 
of shareholder value, both in the professional and academic spheres. The idea was 
soon expanded as Jensen and Meckling (1976) constructed a new “theory of the 
firm” conceptualizing the shareholders as the principal owners of a corporation, with 
original authority regarding its affairs, and managers as their agents with delegated 
powers. 
                                                          
16 According to the International Labour Office’s Global Wage Report 2016/2017: Wage inequality in the 
workplace (2016, p. 45) and Mishel and Schieder (2017, p. 8-10) 
17 Specifically, in an article published September 13, 1970 in The New York Times Magazine titled “The 
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits.” 
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Managers are not legally bound to the maximization of shareholder value in 
itself. It is, however, one of the most utilized metrics used in order to measure a 
corporation’s success and financial health. 
Short-term strategies to increase share value are beneficial to certain types of 
investors and to employees with stock options approaching the vesting date, but can 
prove to be disadvantageous for the sustained success of the company. Stock options 
may encourage executives to prioritize short-term profits, while curtailing 
investment in favor of buybacks that push earnings per share. 
A stock market focused excessively on the short-term may lead companies to 
underinvest (Fang, Tian, and Tice 2014). The liquidity associated with the public 
markets makes it easy for shareholders to quickly sell their stock if a company shows 
the faintest signs of underperformance, rather than actively engaging with 
management. Poor corporate governance practices may take root more easily in this 
environment. Some defend that the markets will automatically resolve this problem 
– if management is lacking, a takeover will happen, because the buyer believes that 
a change in management will lead the company to produce better results, making 
the investment worthwhile. 
Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) observed that high stock liquidity had a causal 
negative effect on firm innovation. One of the authors’ proposed explanations for 
this phenomenon is that because of the threat of takeovers, managers feel pressured 
to cut long-term investment on intangible assets (such as innovation). The other is 
that “high liquidity attracts transient investors, who trade frequently to chase current 
profits or quasi-indexers18 who follow passive indexing strategies and fail to 
govern.”19 Firms with higher levels of quasi-indexer ownership have been observed 
to do more buybacks, and transient investors unsurprisingly prioritize short-term 
earnings over long-term sustainability. 
                                                          
18 Funds with diversified holdings and low portfolio turnover. This concept includes both index funds and 
actively managed diversified mutual funds. 
19 Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014, p. 2123) 
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Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) observed that private firms tend 
to invest more than publicly owned companies (relative to their size), and are also 
more responsive to investment opportunities such as, for example, low interest rates. 
This insensitivity to positive investment climates exists in spite of the fact that public 
stock markets provide access to capital at a lower cost, and was pervasive in all but 
the highest decile of public corporations, which were observed to be substantially 
more responsive to such opportunities than public firms in the lower nine deciles. 
The same results were found even when comparing within-firm variation in 
a sample of companies that went public without raising new capital – which means 
the only change was in ownership structure. After the transition, the investment 
sensitivity of these firms dropped significantly, becoming indistinguishable from 
that of other similar, already-public corporations. 
The authors conclude that “a focus on a firm’s short-term profits or its current 
share price will distort investment decisions from the first-best if investors have 
incomplete information about how much the firm should invest to maximize its 
long-term value.”20 Market information can never be perfect, especially so if related 
to factors dependent on long time horizons. 
This short-sightedness may lead to twisted behaviors. For example, by 
forgoing projects with positive net present value (in other words, projects predicted 
to produce future profits), it is possible to boost current earnings and share price. 
This works because the required initial investment, by not being executed, does not 
lead to a reduction in current distributable earnings. Quarterly earnings reports, 
particularly the focus given to the earnings per share measure, contribute to this 
paranoia. 
Can this maximization of shareholder value be considered value creation? Or 
is it simply a value transfer, from the company to the stockholders? Earnings that 
are disproportionately distributed instead of reinvested compromise the firm’s 
sustainability. Common strategies aimed at raising share prices include layoffs, cost 
                                                          
20 Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015, p. 343) 
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cutting, and overall divestment. This seems to be at odds with sustainable long-term 
growth. 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) surveyed and interviewed more than 
400 executives in order to determine the factors that guide reported earnings and 
disclosure decisions. 78 percent admitted to sacrificing long-term value to smooth 
earnings: “Managers candidly admit that they would take real economic actions such 
as delaying maintenance or advertising expenditure, and would even give up 
positive net present value projects, to meet short-term earnings benchmarks.”21 
CFOs feel the need “to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, especially analyst 
consensus forecasts, because they fear retribution from the stock markets.”21 
In the public markets, earnings estimates (projected by external analysts or 
by the firm itself) are often utilized to evaluate performance. So even if a company 
reports positive growth, if these estimates are not reached, the manager may be seen 
as a failure. 
Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen (2017) analyzed the link between the short-term 
concerns of CEOs and their real investment decisions, using the amount of equity 
scheduled to vest in a given quarter as a reference. The results showed that vesting 
equity is both significantly negatively related to investment growth and significantly 
positively related to analyst forecast revisions and positive earnings predictions. The 
authors conclude that this typically happens as a result of the CEOs’ attempts to 
maximize the value from the sale of their equity stakes in the same quarter as they 
vest. 
The aforementioned results are indicative of the potentially negative effects 
of short-term executive incentives, like stock options, on long-term firm value. It 
must be noted that there is nothing inherently wrong with cost cutting, share 
buybacks, mergers, or acquisitions. The problem resides in the fact that these 
decisions are often made with a disproportionate amount of focus on short-term 
results. 
                                                          
21 Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005, p. 66) 
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Prioritizing the short-term interests of external shareholders may lead to 
biased decision-making in favor of dividend payments and share price maximization 
over investments in research and development, since the latter course of action 
requires immediate expenses which pay off only on the long-term, with returns being 
uncertain or hard to quantify. 
Support for the employee-owned model may lead to more sustainable 
business ventures, better equipped for long-term survival and growth. 
 
5.3. Corporate governance standards 
Theoretically, the voluntary disclosure of information to the capital markets 
leads to several benefits, such as increased liquidity and reduced cost of capital, for 
example. In perfect market conditions, therefore, firms should strive to eliminate 
information asymmetry (Hilary 2006; Bova, Dou, and Hope 2015). However, in the 
context of negotiations between labor and management, it seems that informational 
asymmetry is favorable to the latter’s position, because transparent information 
sharing allows labor representatives to increase their demands (Hilary 2006). 
Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck (2006) assert that publicly traded firms with a 
high level of labor involvement in corporate governance (resulting from employee 
ownership rights) “deviate more from value maximization, spend less on new 
capital, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, and exhibit lower 
labor and total factor productivity.”22 The authors propose that when allowed to 
influence corporate governance strategy, labor representatives’ decisions will be at 
odds with shareholder interests.23 
Curiously, Bova, Dou, and Hope (2015) reached entirely different 
conclusions. Their study revealed that, when employees have bargaining power, 
employee ownership increases voluntary information disclosure to the markets. 
                                                          
22 Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck (2006, p. 490) 
23 On the contrary, Fauver and Fuerst (2006, p. 703) found that “prudent levels of employee representation 
on corporate boards can increase firm efficiency and market value.” However, this effect did not hold in the 
case of union representation. 
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Employee ownership is, therefore, associated with improved corporate governance 
practices, particularly regarding transparency with investors and other stakeholders. 
The authors do agree that firms should disclose less information when employees 
have a strong negotiating position; however, they argue that employee ownership 
decreases employees’ incentives to extract above-market rents from the company, 
which in turn mitigates the firm’s necessity to withhold information. The authors 
disagree with the assertion that employee ownership has decreasing returns with 
higher percentages of ownership24, proposing that employees of fully worker-owned 
businesses are ideally aligned with the objective of maximizing profits. 
Employee ownership, especially if a substantial part of the company is 
employee-owned, offers new solutions. The co-owning worker shareholders are in 
an advantageous position regarding the monitoring of management and have 
firsthand, direct experience with the business. Employee-owned firms tend to 
establish high standards of corporate governance, focusing on transparency and 
trust, resulting from an open line of communication between workers and managers. 
Taking into account all of the preceding arguments, employee ownership 
presents itself as a solid business model, although certainly not one that is fitting for 
every company. Why is it, then, that it is so underexplored? In the following section, 
the discussion will focus on the principal detracting factors to employee ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 The notion that employee ownership has diminishing economic returns is defended by a number of 
researchers. For example, Guedri and Hollandts (2008, p. 460) propose that there is an inverted U-shape 
relationship between employee ownership and accounting-based firm performance measures. According to 
the authors, the “performance implications of employee ownership are positive up to a certain point, after 
which the marginal effect of employee ownership on firm performance becomes negative.” Kim and Ouimet 
(2014) also maintain that small ESOPs (comprising less than 5 percent of company shares) tend to accomplish 
better results than larger employee stock plans. 
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6. Obstacles to employee ownership 
 
Market information is always imperfect to some extent. As such, investors 
and financial institutions prefer investments in tangible assets. When a manager 
claims to be building intangible factors, a process which can be very difficult to 
monitor and assess, lenders may fear that their investment could become 
unrecoverable or that the manager could instead be funneling the funds to some 
illegitimate purpose, such as for his personal benefit. 
In order to foster the development of a participatory culture and management 
style, investments must be made, particularly in relation to human capital – these 
are, of course, investments in intangible assets, very hard to monitor from the 
outside. As such, a close, continual, and transparent relationship between investors 
and the firm may be particularly beneficial to non-traditional companies. As an 
example, Levine (1990) points to the fact that the close relationship between firms 
and their creditors was an important contributing factor to the growth of 
participatory firms in Japan. 
Nuttall (2012) identified three main obstacles to the viability of employee 
ownership: 
 A lack of awareness of the concept of employee ownership itself; 
 Scarcity of resources available to support employee ownership; 
 The legal and tax-related complexities of employee ownership, both real or 
perceived. 
 
Lack of awareness has obvious consequences – if employers, advisors, and 
employees are unaware that it exists, how can employee ownership even begin to be 
considered as an option? In terms of policy and law, if legislators are not aware of 
its existence, employee ownership won’t even be discussed. 
The scarcity of resources is related to the lack of specialized services (both 
private and public) dedicated to providing assistance to businesses interested in 
converting to employee ownership. So even if a business owner and the employees 
Employee Ownership: a novel approach to business 
26 
 
of his company know about employee ownership and are enticed by the idea, 
without counselling and guidance from experienced consultants or legal 
professionals who are knowledgeable about the subject, it is highly unlikely that the 
conversion could be achieved successfully. 
The final point requires little explanation. If the transition process is overly 
cumbersome, the administrative and bureaucratic difficulties alone will stifle 
employee ownership’s appeal. Policy-makers and legislators ought to create 
standard procedures of conversion in order to simplify the process. Fiscal incentives 
are also a possibility. 
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7. Employee ownership in Portugal 
 
In a study focused on financial participation in the European Union, Hashi 
and Hashani (2013) found that large companies in the financial sector were the most 
likely to have financial participation schemes (both employee share ownership and 
profit sharing plans) available for their employees to join. Other factors that are 
associated with a greater likelihood of a firm adopting financial participation 
schemes include a higher proportion of high-skill employees and the existence of 
worker representation. Companies that offer training to their staff and organize the 
work in teams also displayed an advantage. As expected, employees in managerial 
positions are more likely to participate in these plans. This study also revealed that 
the popularity of employee financial participation plans is lower in the Iberian 
Peninsula (and Southern Europe in general) than in the remainder of Europe. 
An analysis of the latest Annual Economic Survey of Employee Share 
Ownership in European Countries (relative to 2018), carried out by the European 
Federation of Employee Share Ownership, reveals the poor condition of employee 
ownership in Portugal. Not only is Portugal below the European average in respect 
to the percentage of capital held by employees25, but after categorizing that small 
faction of workers as either “top executives” or “ordinary employees” the results 
emerge as extremely unbalanced, with the vast majority of capital held by employees 
being owned by the “top executives” group.26 
Proper broad-based employee ownership plans, which implement both 
employee ownership and participation, seem to be close to nonexistent in Portugal. 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Portuguese employees hold under 2 percent of companies’ capital, while the European average is just over 
3 percent. 
26 Annual Economic Survey of Employee Share Ownership in European Countries: 2018, p. 49-50 
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8. Closing observations 
 
8.1. Limitations 
This literature review was executed taking into account the fact that employee 
ownership’s full range of possible benefits needs more than just stock ownership on 
the part of a firm’s employees in order to materialize. Various synergistic practices 
were scrutinized, duly integrated with an analysis of the psychological mechanisms 
through which workers come to develop feelings of ownership toward their 
company (and their role within it). Inevitably, however, there are certain limitations 
to the present review that must be mentioned ahead of the concluding remarks. 
One of the problems with the academic body of literature on employee 
ownership stems from the fact that a great part of the research was conducted using 
data from public companies, which usually have a very minor percentage of 
company stock committed to their employee share plans. There are hints that 
employee ownership could produce even more positive results in the small and 
medium-sized sector if implemented at a more substantial level; however, this area 
of research is still vastly underexplored. 
Another issue pertains to the fact that most studies are focused on companies 
from either the United States of America or the United Kingdom, especially the 
former. This is not surprising seeing as employee ownership is, both culturally and 
legislatively, more developed in those countries. This does mean, however, that the 
results may not be entirely transferable to other territories. 
We have established that employee ownership needs a specific set of 
complementary factors in order to flourish effectively. While this notion is widely 
acknowledged in the literature, some researchers do not take these synergies (or lack 
thereof) into account in their data analyses. Without the presence of high 
performance work practices and a suitable management style, the adequate 
development of an ownership culture is compromised, and so are its benefits. This 
circumstance could explain some of the conflicting results of various studies. 
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Having clarified the limitations of the present literature review, we proceed 
to the final remarks. 
 
8.2. Conclusion 
Graeme Nuttall, a British expert on employee ownership, was approached by 
the English Government to undertake an independent review into employee 
ownership. In the resulting 2012 report, he identified three main strategic areas of 
intervention which should be prioritized in order to effectively promote employee 
ownership: raising awareness, increasing resources available to support it, and 
reducing its complexity. The Nuttall Review’s recommendations resulted in the 
creation of the Finance Act of 2014. 
Lampel, Banerjee, and Bhalla (2018) observed that in the United Kingdom, 
there was a notable boost in the number of employee-owned businesses after the 
aforementioned Finance Act of 2014 was approved (which, among many other 
provisions, redesigned tax incentives and established a new employee ownership 
model scheme). Personal interviews revealed that this piece of legislation was seen 
as important not only because of the tax benefits it introduced, but also for the role 
it played in increasing awareness about the existence of employee ownership itself. 
Hansmann (1996) proposed that because ownership conversions can be 
brokered, the associated costs are often modest relative to the value of the firm, and 
therefore do not form an impediment to changes in ownership. That statement 
assumes that employee ownership is already a part of the local business and legal 
environment – because, as the author put it, “important economies derive both from 
the presence of established brokers who specialize in ownership transactions and 
from the existence of standardized procedures for handling those transactions. 
Where such institutions have not yet developed, the costs of adopting or converting 
to a particular form of ownership may be high.”27 
                                                          
27 Hansmann (1996, p. 46) 
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Employee ownership is undoubtedly an underdeveloped topic in Portugal, 
both academically and politically (not to mention in practice). Taking into account 
the European Union’s recommendations on this topic28, lawmakers could improve 
the situation by offering tax incentives and creating basic models for broad-based 
ownership schemes, so that employee share plans do not have to be built from 
scratch for every new adoption. The development of favorable financing 
arrangements specifically for leveraged employee buyouts would also make them a 
more attractive option. 
Employee ownership has the potential to attract support across the ideological 
spectrum in Portuguese politics, as it has in other countries. On the one hand, it is a 
form of private ownership – there is a clear link between the private ownership and 
the return on capital, with the reward being market-based. On the other, it promotes 
a broad-based expansion in the distribution of corporate profits, a welcome step 
against the rising levels of wealth inequality. It depends on private initiative, with 
plan designers having a great degree of flexibility regarding its structure and 
characteristics. On top of this, employee ownership makes companies more resilient 
against economic recessions, which are all but inevitable in the economic system of 
the West. This idea has rallied bipartisan support in the United Kingdom and in the 
United States – a consensus could certainly also be achieved in Portugal, despite the 
(sometimes dogmatic) adversarial political climate. 
Direct employee ownership is already an available option, but low levels of 
awareness and the lack of legal structures and professional services related to the 
field make its implementation overly cumbersome, especially for smaller 
businesses. Policy-makers can work to reverse this scenario through relatively 
simple means: a few strategic changes to the law, coupled with tax incentives, could 
certainly have a positive effect. 
                                                          
28 The European Union has demonstrated ample support for employee ownership, and among many other 
publications on the subject, has commissioned the development of four reports regarding the promotion of 
employee participation in profits and enterprise results, also known as the PEPPER Reports. 
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Indirect employee ownership as it exists in the United States and United 
Kingdom is, on the other hand, currently not possible to implement in Portugal.29 
However, the idea of representative employee involvement in governance based on 
pooled voting rights merits consideration for future legislative developments. 
Employee ownership appears to be a particularly promising option regarding 
business succession.30 A focus on this particular transition point could lead to 
significant evolution in the small and medium-sized enterprise sector, strengthening 
local communities and the economy as a whole. Sadly, it seems that without some 
sort of political backing, this is unlikely to take place – on the other hand, as 
evidenced by the British example, a little support from the government can make a 
big difference. 
Employee ownership is a solid option for many businesses, with strong 
potential for growth. It just needs a push in the right direction. As Graeme Nuttall 
put it: “Many in the employee ownership sector have said their awareness of the 
concept is because of serendipity. This must change. A great idea should not depend 
on a happy accident to spread awareness.”31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 Recourse to an employee ownership trust is not an available option in Portugal, as trusts are not accepted 
under Portuguese law. 
30 Lampel, Banerjee, and Bhalla (2018) point to the fact that in the United Kingdom, more than 60 percent of 
small and medium-sized enterprises are estimated not to have a succession plan. If circumstances are even 
moderately similar regarding Portuguese companies, this represents an opportunity to promote long-lasting 
and stabilizing changes in the business environment. 
31 Nuttall (2012, p. 5) 
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